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Law
Mo"Art HAixcocK*
"The maiden touched that clay-cauld corpse,
A drap it never bled.
The ladye laid her hand on him,
And soon the ground was red."
Ballad of Earl Richard.
Whenever the mechanical-magical modes of proof (oath, bat-
tie, ordeals) used throughout Europe in the Twelfth Century, are
mentioned in a modem law school the instructor senses that his
students are at once skeptical and puzzled. It is as if the instructor
had suddenly begun to tell fairy tales without announcing any
change of pace. Yet we know that the people of that time took
much the same view of their modes of proof as the student takes of
present-day procedure. How can the instructor demonstrate this,
completely and convincingly?
The obstacles to the students' understanding are at first sight
very formidable. The problem of looking backward through mod-
ern spectacles has bedevilled even the best historians. We are all
trained from childhood to adopt as habits the social customs, tradi-
tions, and practices of our times. We absorb contemporary prej-
udices and ideals. When we come to study the ways of the medieval
man we find it very difficult to avoid the unconscious assumption
that he will always think and act just as we should do in similar
circumstances. Our greatest difficulty lies in the use of words. We
must rely upon them as our tools of thought and communication,
yet many of them call up in our minds little modem pictures' which
are quite irrelevant to the medieval scene. A "court" was then an
assembly of representatives or a great lord surrounded by his vas-
sals. An "inquest" was a group of neighbours summoned to tell
what they had witnessed or been told by others. A "statute" was
a royal proclamation which could be made with or without the
concurrence of lords or commons. It is quite impossible to fit the
Anglo-Norman practice of private suit by the injured party, in-
volving a possible fine to the King, into our modem classification
of "torts" or "crimes." To get a realistic picture of the past we
must almost learn a new language.
Perhaps the most difficult obstacle of all is the student's mis-
conception of the procedure of his own time. The student does
not understand a jury trial as a successful trial lawyer under-
stands it. His notions of a modern trial are oversimplified and
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rationalistic; they may be indicated by such phrases as "govern-
ment of laws," "jury finds the facts and the judge applies the law,"
"preponderance of evidence," "irrelevant matters rigidly exclud-
ed." His notion that a trial is nothing more than an investigation
of relevant facts will not itself bear much investigation. Yet these
obstacles must somehow be dealt with. We have, alas! no magic
carpet to take us back to the shire-moot. The iron law of pedagogy
compels us to speak to the student in terms that are familiar to
him, to proceed from the known to the unknown.
We may rely, however, on one common bond of understanding
between the modern student and the medieval litigant: they are
both human beings. For while instinct and tradition, ideals and
prejudices, systems of thought and learning have undergone dras-
tic alterations since the days of the first King Henry, the basic ele-
ments of human nature are still the same. Perhaps we may sur-
mount the obstacles discussed by first showing to the student
something of his own emotional needs and desires and the effect
they have, the part they play, in his relations with his fellow-men.
With this foundation to build upon we may proceed to show to
what a high degree these same needs and desires, operating among
men of an earlier day, were satisfied and reconciled by medieval
law. If we succeed in this we shall have also eliminated the most
difficult of our obstacles. For having unmasked, with cool detach-
ment, the emotionally satisfying character of Anglo-Norman legal
procedure, the student will be well-equipped to perform the same
operation on that of his own generation.
What are the factors of human nature which the student of
legal history should carefully consider? He should realize that
man is a creature of many divergent and contradictory impulses.
He is fearfully and wonderfully made; a thousand times more
complicated than the reasonable, prudent man of the law or the
greedy acquisitive man of classical economics. In the words of Dr.
West, "alive within our minds is man loving more than we can
trust ourselves to love, hating more than we dare hate; man gen-
erous to a fault beyond our faults, man mean and cruel, lustful,
cowardly and brave. No human power can 'free us from the body
of this death' or from the tremendous possibilities of this our human
liRfe." 2
For a long, long time after birth, through babyhood and child-
hood, we are dependent on our parents and other adults for many
things essential to our well-being -food and clothing, love and care.
During infancy we have an unpleasant sense of helplessness and
danger; we cling to our parents for the reassurance of their love;
we need them to help us and protect us from the harsh and un-
2 West, CoNscmTCE A Soc=r 156 (1945).
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known world. The loss of their love would be a terrible calamity.
Consciously and unconsciously we strive to win and retain their
affection. Becoming deeply rooted in our minds during our earliest
years of growth, this fearful need for love and a sense of security
remains with us all our lives.3 We constantly strive to satisfy it
by winning for ourselves the love, affection, friendship and respect
of our fellow-men. "One of the most striking things about man's
social life," says Dr. West, "is that it is so natural to him that he
makes the utmost use of his earliest opportunities to develop his
various powers of relationship with others. 4
Beginning in earliest infancy the child builds up in his own
mind an ideal picture of himself as he feels he ought to be, based,
as we have indicated, on his relations with his parents and, as
time goes on, his relations with other people. Throughout his life
this ideal social self exercises a predominating influence over his
behavior. As Robinson explains, "the contents of the self are large-
ly social. A man's most intimate thoughts deal with what he thinks
others think about him Whenever a man feels that his conduct is
important he looks upon it as though through the eyes of another
person; he stands, a spectator upon the curb, and watches him-
self go by."s Needless to say, we frequently fail to live up to our
ideal standards. We lose our tempers, we gratify our selfish appe-
tites, we stand aloof from those in need of help. But if we violate
those standards in any drastic manner we suffer the unpleasant
pangs of self-recrimination. For example, Lady Macbeth and her
husband defied their consciences when they murdered Duncan
and his sons; throughout the remainder of the play they are made
to suffer the terrible agonies of the mind ridden by guilt.
Susceptible as it is to so many strong and conflicting impulses,
the mind naturally must be equipped with devices for reconciling
3 See Flugel, Mix, Mow s mm Socisrr 52-58 (1945). At p. 56 he writes:
"All these writers seem to consider that man's need of social support is due
at bottom to an attitude that he inevitably acquires during his long defenceless
infancy in which he is dependent on parental love and care."
4 West, CONSCIENCE Aqn Socur, 108 (1945).
s Robinson, LAw AND TsE LA wRs 179 (1935). See also West, "A Psy-
chological Theory of Law," INTER TATIONS OF MODERN LEGAL PnBLosopaIEs 772,
where he writes: "But this crucial fact for social psychology remains. Freud
has established it beyond a peradventure, that we grow up possessed of two
selves. They are two selves which fortunately for us are seldom as divergent
as 'Dr. Jekyll' and 'Mr. Hyde' in Robert Louis Stevenson's famous story. But
they are two selves which we can describe as self-acceptable selves and self-
rejected selves. The self-acceptable selves are the selves we usually like to
be, because they are in consonance with what, by constant readjustment from
the nursery onwards, we have come to feel to be what society reasonably de-
mands of us and welcomes in us. The self-rejected selves are the selves we have
decided, by the same tokens, to repress."
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them. The layman has heard of some of them such as repression,
sublimation, compensation and rationalization. He should not as-
sume or infer that there is something abnormal or irregular about
the conflict of incompatible impulses. It should be regarded, in Rob-
inson's words, "not as a disturbance in the smooth course of thought
and action, but as a fundamental feature of human nature,- the
normal man does not have to work out any elaborate compensatory
device to make possible the forbearance of a golf game or a fish-
ing trip.' 6 The most serious impulses with which the individual
must deal are those involving "aggression" against other persons or
their property for which we have various labels: cruelty, anger,
rage, or fear. None of us are such saints as to be immune from
these; when we feel them we usually contrive to turn them aside
or dissipate them somehow. Thus on receiving an irritating letter
we may angrily crumple the paper or rip it to pieces. Or we may
utter profane curses thus breaking a mild rule of conscience and
good behavior. But in one way or another, consciously or uncon-
sciously, we must deflect the aggressive impulse if we are to con-
tinue in happy relations with our fellows. Since the chief purpose
of law is to restrain aggression in the interests of all members of
the community the legal historian will take a special interest in all
mental devices for deflecting strong emotion or resolving conflicts.7
While on the subject of conflicts let us take note of a particular
type which the psychologist calls "ambivalence." The arch-type
of all ambivalence is found in the relation of parent and child. As
we have seen, the child is completely dependent on its parents for
love, care and protection. Yet in its early years the parents must
constantly frustrate the child's wishes and restrain it from doing
many things it wants to do. When the child disobeys them the par-
ents punish him, partly because they are angry, partly to prevent
a repetition of the offense. The child, a rather primitive little crea-
ture, naturally hates them for it. At the same time the child goes
on loving and admiring them. "Indeed," writes Dr. Flugel, "it is
man's inevitable tragedy (due to his long period of helpless infancy)
that he is compelled to hate those whom he most loves."8 Almost
as soon as it is felt the child's hatred is controlled by various un-
conscious and automatic processes (the child may reenact the spank-
ing or spank one of its dolls); but the hatred does not disappear en-
tirely. It remains buried deep in the unconscious: when years later
the same boy finds himself confronted by an authority-wielding
school-teacher the old anger rises up and by the process of fantasy-
6 Robinson, LAw AxD TBE LAwras 294 (1935).
7 For some interesting suggestions regarding the relation of emotional
conflicts and law see Robinson, LAw m =E LAwymS 145-153, 284-307 (1935).
8 Flugel, MAN, MORALS AN Socm-Ty 36 (1945).
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identification 9 is directed now against the teacher. For the moment
he is cast in the role of the forbidding, punishing father. A good
teacher can, of course, by kindness, understanding, and personal
charm win for himself, in part at least, the role of the good loving
father in the child's unconsciousness association of ideas. In that
event he may be quickly forgiven. But woe betide the unfortunate
teacher who is cast in the bad father role exclusively; he will be
thoroughly hated. The popular caricature of the teacher is not a
pretty one.
The process of fantasy-identification is not limited to uncon-
scious associations with the father-figure; every vivid but forgotten
experience of childhood may operate in this way. The mind keeps
many childhood memories in a locked and secret file: we do not
know they are there, but they nevertheless influence, more or less,
our every day decisions and actions. "A man may gain employ-
ment because of the tone of his voice, or lose it because of the color
of his necktie, without his master being in the least aware, at his
point of relevant decision, that these were factors in determining
that decision."' 0 But the father-figure, with its double-barrelled
associations of "good father" and "bad father" is deeply imbedded
in every one of us. All down through history men have unconscious-
ly attributed "good father" qualities to the judge, the priest and the
king." But in times of revolution they did not find it difficult to see
the king in a "bad-father" light.
Another ambivalent attitude, of great interest to lawyers, pro-
duces our mingled feelings toward the criminal Why do we feel
a strange flutter of pity when we see someone being arrested or
riding in "Black Maria"? Why do juries so often acquit the prisoner,
in spite of the evidence, when they feel sorry for him? Each of us
once stood, a prisoner at the bar of the parental court, where father
or mother sat as judge. In that agonizing moment of long ago
something went into the deepest part of our minds which now moves
us to pity: we "identify" ourselves with the prisoner "in fantasy."' 2
And many other examples of "ambivalence" could be furnished
from daily experience. Paradoxical as it may seem at first sight,
there is really no mystery about it. How often do we remonstrate
with our friends to the effect that their thoughts and feelings on
9 The phenomenon of fantasy identification is clearly explained by West
in CoNscIEcE AN SocIy 64-67, 156-159.
10 West, "Psychological Theory of Law" in nuEaPPxrATioNs OF mODnN
LrsAL Prmosopmms 775 (1947).
U See Reiwald, Socimr AND ITs CaRnxALs, Chapter 3, "The Judge and the
Father" (1950).
12 See Reiwald, Socir A Its C mnmr zs 48 (1950).
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various topics are "not at all consistent."' 3 After all, one does not
need to study psychology to know that when a girl prettily protests
against her boy friend kissing her she may be harboring contra-
dictory feelings.
Psychologists have frequently called attention to the significant
part that fantasy and drama play in our lives. Most of us spend
a good deal of time following the trials and triumphs of fictitious
characters in stories and novels, on stage and screen or radio and
television. As children we spend even more of our time at playing
"let's pretend." Imaginary experiences satisfy something deep with-
in us. As adults we do not confine our dramatization to the stage.
At many times and in many places we take part in little dramatic
rituals. Special costumes are donned for weddings, graduations,
and formal balls. Special ceremonies are held for inaugurating of-
ficials in government and elsewhere. Clubs and fraternities stage
impressive rituals for the initiation of new members.
It is not difficult to suggest several mental ingredients in these
performances. There is often some gratification of our ego; we all
like to dress up and strut around a little. In weddings and initiation
ceremonies the participants are both warned and inspired to carry
out new obligations in the future. The robes of the priest and the
judge lend a special dignity to a solemn occasion. But all these ac-
counts seem to leave something unsaid for the spectators too are
affected by them. They receive from the drama a certain sense of
security. As the office-holder takes his oath we who watch feel a
greater conviction that he will carry out his proper functions. As
we watch any of these ceremonies we feel, with varying degrees of
intensity, the assurance that that is being done which ought to be
done and it will be done for evermore, amen.
The student of legal history will frequently be concerned with
the behavior of men acting in concert as members of groups, com-
monly called institutions. If he is observant (and it is not always
easy to be historically observant) he will discover a striking duality
in institutional behavior. Most institutions have certain avowed
purposes and objectives, often set forth in a creed or ritual. The ac-
tual behavior of the members will normally be found to vary con-
siderably from that which would be indicated by the creed or ritual.
We should not blame the institutions or their members for this
disparity. Like conflict, ambivalence, and fantasy-identification it
is the normal phenomenon; it occurs all the time as a part of our day
to day life. College fraternities usually have a very idealistic and
impressive initiation ritual. As we see them in everyday life they
seem to devote most of their energies to drinking beer and holding
parties. In their magazine advertisements banks and insurance
13 See Robinson, LAv mo THE LAwYExs 158-163 (1935).
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companies play the role of big brothers and friends of humanity.
Lawyers who have to deal directly with these institutions discover
that they pursue policies never mentioned in the advertisement.
Biographies and memoirs of famous trial lawyers contain anecdotes
and other data about the actual working of trial by jury which
simply do not coincide with newspaper editorials praising this grand
old institution.
A detailed study of the actual operation of any institution in-
variably reveals sharp contrasts between the actual operation and
the little ideal pictures of the institution in people's minds. To any-
one who does not realize that this disparity exists in all institutions
such a study appears to be an attack upon the institution. This dis-
parity between theory and practice is merely a faithful reflection
in institutional behavior of certain characteristics of human nature
which we have already discussed. It reflects to some extent the
difference between the individual's ideal picture of himself and
his actual conduct. It also reflects, to a degree, the difference be-
tween the dramas and fantasy which we all enjoy and our every-
day activities in the real world.14
No outline of the nature of man, either medieval or modem,
would be complete without some account of the element of "magic"
in our thinking; the fond notion that we can control the external
world by manipulating disconnected symbolic objects or casting a
spell of words. If the reader thinks modem man has emancipated
himself, let him recall to mind the newspaper columns on astrology,
the eminent believers in spiritualism, the popularity of quacks and
patent medicines, the recurrent sproutings of simple political cure-
alls, the faddish little "religions" and cults. Less than three hundred
years separate us from the rationalistic seventeenth century, the
age of Newton and Descartes, when they burnt cats and women
for sorcery. Chief Justice Hale, who coined the phrase "affected
with a public interest" and wrote a book on criminal law which
still enjoys a high reputation, believed quite sincerely in witches and
instructed juries on the proper weighing of evidence of sorcery.
Hale was no more fool than you or I; but magic which is easy to
detect in other people's cultures is notoriously elusive in one's own.
Magic satisfies many desires: when directed against an enemy
it gratifies hatred; when used to make crops grow it brings a com-
forting sense of security, of optimism and hope. It provides a kind
of drama of wishful thinking; but it has a curious logic of its own,
much resembling the logic of the unconscious mind dredged up
by psychoanalysis. "A man desires his child to grow; therefore
he chews the sprouts of the salmon berry and spits it over the
14For many illustrations of the psychology of institutions see APwow,
SYmmoLs oF GovraswsiT (1935).
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child's body that it may grow as rapidly as the salmon berry. He
smears the dust of mussel shells on the child's temples that it may
endure as long as mussel shells .... It [Magic] teaches, for ex-
ample, that a treatment of the sword which has caused the wound
will cure the wound, or that milk can be made to sour properly by
treating the sacred cowbell." Ruth Benedict, who gives these ex-
amples and many more, sums up the theory of magical practices as
follows: "They [the magicians] are merely acting upon a basic
philosophical creed which, if it were explicitly phrased, would be
similar to that of the medieval doctrine of the macrocosm and the
microcosm which assumes the existence of a mystic sympathy per-
vading the universe, thus making facts observable or brought to
pass in one field significant and operative also in another."13
Let us turn now to a shire-moot of the early Tenth Century
1 6
and see what insights a smattering of psychology may give us. We
must take some note, of course, of the economic background: the
small villages with their feudal agriculture, the great lonely for-
ests, moors and marshes, the bad roads and slow transportation.
We must also notice the political background, a de-centralized
feudal arrangement with an aggressive Norman king who has in-
herited the tradition of a weak Anglo-Saxon monarchy. Many
courts have fallen under the control of feudal potentates, great and
small, but the shire-moot still retains its independence under the
presidency of the sheriff, a royal official. The king's court is with
the king; it has not yet made its power felt in every village though
the time is not far distant when it will do so in the field of litiga-
tion for freehold land.
The shire-moot has no officers to compel the defendant to come
to court or to summon him. If, after several summonses by the
plaintiff the defendant fails to appear, the plaintiff may obtain the
license of the court to seize some of the defendant's cattle as a
distraint. If the charge is a grave one the court may eventually
declare defendant an outlaw, to be seized and hanged if captured.
There are, of course, no police. There is no possibility of judgment
by default. A lawsuit is regarded as a kind of voluntary arbitra-
tion where both parties come and agree to settle their quarrel by
Is Benedict, Article on "Magic" in 10, EcLYcoP~EA oF THE SocaAL Sciusco
39 (1933).
16 The account of legal proceedings given here is based upon 2 PoLLocK
AND MATLAwD, HISTORY OF ENGuSH LAw 598-612, 632-641 (2d Ed 1899); 1 HoLDs-
WORTH, IhSTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 297-312, vol. 2, pp. 102-117 (3rd ed.); THAYE,
PRELIMARY TREATISE oN EvIDENC E 7-47 (1898); PLucxsrrr, CoNcisr HISTORY OF
THE CohmoN LAw 108-113 (2nd. ed. 1936). The ancient proofs are all very
fully discussed in LEA, SUPERsTIToI AnD FoRcE. (4th ed. 1892). A psychological
account of the probable origins of the ordeals will be found in Gonr, PMn-
rriv ORAm AND Moanu LAw (1923).
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the traditional methods of the court. But even if the defendant does
not come to court he can delay the proceedings for a long time with
various essoins (excuses). If he does come and the court should
give judgment for the plaintiff it still has no officers who can en-
force the judgment.
In those days everyone had weapons and knew how to use
them. One wonders why aggrieved plaintiffs bothered with such
a feeble and dilatory arm of the law. But the shire-moot heard many
cases. It is the pressure of public opinion which constrains men to
resort to litigation rather than force. Force begets force and in a
culture where the tie of kinship is still very strong it begets the
blood-feud which may wipe out an entire community. The pow-
erful gregarious "instinct" with its origins going back to babyhood
is on the side of law and order as against private war. No one
who lives in a village wants to incur the disapproval of the entire
community. On the other hand, by going to law in proper fashion
the injured party can marshall the sentiments of the community
in his own favor and against his opponent.
Assuming, however, that both parties are at the court, ready
to proceed, we reach the stage of oral pleadings. The plaintiff states
his case in a certain fixed form of words. The defendant states a
general denial in all cases but may then proceed to allege a specific
defense (e.g., to allege a chain of title to a chattel). But specific de-
fences are rare. These altercations in open court give the angry
litigants an outlet for their emotions; each can feel that he is at
least doing something to embarrass his opponent.
When the pleading has been completed the court renders the
medial judgment awarding the proof to one party or the other and
determining the mode of proof to be used. In theory the judgment
is that of all the township representatives attending the court
(called doomsmen); in practice the judgment is probably deter-
mined by a small group of the oldest and wisest. In theory certain
rules are supposed to be followed but in practice the decision will
be based on sound discretion and common sense. The wisest rule
constantly encounters unprovided cases. Moreover, without print-
ing or a legal profession, it would be quite impossible for anything
but a few broad general principles to be preserved from generation
to generation. In general the attitude seems to have been "defend-
ant stands accused, let him clear himself." If he is a man of good
standing he may be allowed to do so by a simple form of oath. If
he has been often accused he may be sent to one of the painful
ordeals of hot iron or boiling water. On the other hand, the plain-
tiff may offer to prove his case by battle or witnesses and the
doomsmen have the power to award it to him if they consider this
a wise course. The award of proof might be a burden or a ben-
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efit depending on the mode of proof prescribed. Even the oath
could be made difficult by requiring many compurgators. A day
is fixed for the proof to take place and the court adjourns. If the
party who has been ordered to prove his case appears and performs
the proof successfully he has won the lawsuit. If he does not, his
opponent is the victor.
Let us consider first the proof by oath or compurgation. It
became part of the common law where it lasted a long time under
the name "wager of law." The defendant is required to take an oath
in a set form of words, denying the plaintiff's claim. A number of
other men must then swear, in succession, that the defendant's oath
is a true oath. The number of oath-helpers, which may vary as
widely as three or seventy-two, is fixed by the court. If a wrong
word is used the oath "bursts" and the adversary wins. The oath-
helpers are not in any sense witnesses. There is no requirement
that they have any knowledge of the facts. At an early date they
were required to be kinsmen of the defendant since the kinsmen
would be involved in the blood-feud if it were not prevented. Later
the defendant might bring anyone whom he could persuade to act
for him. However, although they need not have personal knowl-
edge of the facts, they take the risk of Divine vengeance for swear-
ing falsely if their oath be in fact untrue. And should subsequent
events on earth show them to be wrong they are punished severe-
ly for perjury.
Modern writers have been puzzled to account for a system of
proof which relies willingly upon the sworn statements of those
who know nothing of the facts and then punishes them if they turn
out to be wrong. But men of earlier ages are not absolutely il-
logical; they merely happen to use one system of logic in a place
where we should use another. The basic logic on which the pro-
bative force of the oath rests is that a word has some mystic con-
nection with that for which it stands. Experience seems to bear
this out because by saying "devil" or "snake" you can produce a
fairly vivid image in your hearer's mind. If you call a child or a
pet animal by name it will come to you. Verbal sorcery assumes
such a mystic connection between words and objects; if the words
are properly cast together the objects must obey.17 The common
law recognized verbal sorcery, of course, and borrowed some of its
logic. We have all been taught that "to A and his heirs" gives A a
fee simple and at common law no other words will do the trick. The
famous rule in Shelley's Case works the same way.
Proof by compurgation uses the same logic in reverse. The
defendant and his compurgators have solemnly stated upon oath
17 See Malinowski, "The General Theory of Magical Language" in LEE,
LATGUAr.E OF WISoD AND FOLLY 239-243 (1949).
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that certain acts and events involving certain persons and objects
did not occur. Words have a mystic connection with persons and
objects. Therefore, if those acts and events had actually occurred
it would have been impossible to fit the false words together; the
tongue would slip and the oath would "burst."
The performance of this proof, whether successful or not,
served to deflect and dissipate the aggressive impulses of the liti-
gants and their friends. When they all assemble on the day named,
to see the defendant make his law, their attention and interest is
shifted from the hated opponent and the facts in dispute to the
solemn procedure of the oath. Each side watches intently to see
who will win. What began as a bitter session of harsh accusa-
tions comes now to seem a little more like a sporting event. It is
easy for the mind of man to take on two different attitudes at the
same time. While each litigant still believes his cause is just he
cannot help becoming curious to see who will win. When the pro-
ceeding ends and the oath has "burst" or been sworn successfully,
some of the friends of the losing party will feel that justice has
probably been done as far as that is possible. Even the losing party
himself will be aware that he has had "a run for his money," his day
in court. He may still be very angry but he will sense that the
community is not sympathetic. He is not entirely without remedy.
He can go to the king's court and complain of a denial of justice in
the shire-moot. But this will be a costly and tedious procedure.
After thinking it over he will probably decide to give it up.
However bitter his defeat the losing litigant has one great consola-
tion; he has succeeded in dramatizing his quarrel. He has lifted it
out of the run of everyday unpleasant experiences and raised it
to the level of a solemn and tragic drama in which he himself
played a leading role. He has fought it through to the limit of his
resources and he can do no more.18
Wager of law had a long history; it was by far the most tena-
cious of the ancient modes of proof. In the late twelfth century it
developed another logical basis of a more modem type; the oath-
helpers came to be regarded as "character witnesses." As every
student knows, wager of law became the normal proof for the
forms of action, debt and detinue, in the King's courts. We see many
instances of its use in the fourteenth century. Professional swear-
ers appeared who could do a correct oath for a money payment.
Variations were devised by which the court had a hand in choosing
the compurgators. Its availability in the royal courts was gradually
limited by the judges. Plaintiffs' lawyers all but abandoned the use
of debt and detinue in the sixteenth century. As a procedure in
18 For a psychological account of the litigant's attitude toward a lawsuit
see Gorrm, PRanrnn ORDEALs AND MOEN LAw 250-258, 267-275 (1923).
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actual use compurgation survived longest in the ecclesiastical courts.
"But surely," says the modern student, "cases must have oc-
curred where litigants offered to prove their claims or defences by
the testimony of witnesses to the facts." Why, of course; witnesses
were most important in the law, especially when one was buying
cattle. In some circumstances the plaintiff could not bring a suit
without them. And there is good evidence, though mostly from the
following century, of a form of proof by witnesses. There are some
scanty rules as to when it may be awarded. The witnesses step up
and make sworn statements. "There was no testing by cross-ex-
amination; the operative thing was the oath itself, and not the pro-
bative quality of what was said, or its persuasion on a judge's
mind."' 9 The suit is won by the side who produces the most
witnesses, provided they all tell the same tale. In short, the proof
is made according to a mechanical formula; the oath alone is op-
erative; the judges take no responsibility for determining which
side has the most persuasive testimony.
Now these thirteenth century cases are cases decided not by
doomsmen but by commissions of royal judges, men of great
prestige and power. Why do they hesitate to question the witnesses
and evaluate the testimony? To substitute proof by the judge's
good sense for proof by counting heads would be a very slight
change in a well-established procedure. But this short step is not
taken by either doomsmen or royal judges. The community does
not want the. judges to exercise this power. Deep in the subcon-
scious mind of every seorl and thegn lies the quaint, distorted, but
glowing picture of that childhood court of long ago where Father
was judge wielding unlimited power. It rises to consciousness not
as a "scene remembered," but simply as a feeling, a conviction, a
prejudice; this procedure is not "justice." The judges themselves
share this feeling. In the Thirteenth Century thoughtful men are
dissatisfied with the older proofs and innovations are being tried,
but proof by will of the judge is not believed to be the answer.
Our earliest notions of justice are nurtured in the parental
court where differences between father and son, brother and sister,
are tried. The judge of later adult life cannot escape the uncon-
scious associations with the father, good and bad. The learned
legal writing of our own day is full of talk about the need for re-
straining rules, the evils of "arbitrary" power in the judge. Down
through the ages men have been willing to entrust great powers
to kings and dictators, to a general of an army, a captain of a ship,
a man of property, - but never to the judge.
Of course, in actual practice, judges do decide cases. In the
shire-moot, as we have seen, an intelligent and very human dis-
19 TAYR, PRELmn Xy TREATIsE oN EvmEmC 17 (1898).
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cretion is exercised by the elder doomsmen in awarding the
medial judgment. But this very real power of the doomsmen is
carefully concealed by several protective devices. These devices
operate to protect the judge against the "bad father" attitude, jeal-
ous of his powers, and also against pressure from the litigants or
reprisals from the losing side. The first of these devices is the
theory that the medial judgment has been rendered by the entire
body of freemen representatives; there is great safety in numbers.
The second is the theory that the judgment has been pronounced in
accordance with certain fixed rules. Some rules, no doubt, there
are but they cannot cover all cases. The third and most important
device is the proof itself (oath, ordeal, etc.) which brings the litiga-
tion to a climax, distracting all hostile feelings from the judges to
the final test. Thus we find an extraordinary array of shock-ab-
sorbers concealing and protecting the doomsmen who steer the
litigation toward a decision.
Very different from the proof by oaths are the painful ordeals
of hot iron and boiling water. The hot iron was more commonly
used in England. The administration of the test rested entirely in
the hands of the Church as represented by the parish priest. Full
instructions were contained in the service books of the time. The
accused prepared for the ordeal by fasting three days. On the
day appointed the priest said Mass, the accused was urged to con-
fess, if guilty, and received the holy communion. Psalms and
litanies were sung. The iron was blessed and adjured to show
truly whether the accused was innocent. At the proper moment
indicated by the priest the accused took the iron, which was sup-
posed to be glowing hot, in his hand and carried it a distance of
nine feet. His hand was then bandaged and sealed by the judges.
After three days the bandage was removed. If festering blood was
found in the track of the iron he was adjudged guilty; if the wound
appeared clean he had proved his innocence.
In England the hot iron seems to have been reserved for charges
of more serious crimes. There was a rule that persons who failed at
the proof by oath or who had been often accused or whose reputa-
tion was bad should be sent to the hot iron. There is a certain mys-
tery about this ordeal; records of the time indicate that the accused
frequently succeeded in clearing himself. It seems highly probable
that the officiating priest sometimes made the final human de-
cision on the question of guilt. If he believed the accused was in-
nocent or deserving of pardon he tempered justice with mercy by
seeing to it that the iron could not inflict too severe a burn. The
administration of ordeals was a source of considerable profit to the
local churches. A too severe administration of the test with one-
sided results might have driven it out of use. Lea, who collected
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a great deal of data about ancient modes of trial went so far as
to conclude that "it was a recognized doctrine of the church that
confession, contrition and absolution so thoroughly washed away a
sin that a culprit thus prepared could safely tempt the justice of
God."20
A successful political institution must dramatize several im-
portant human ideas and contrive to reconcile their contradictions.2 1
The hot iron proof admirably met the requirements. In the first
place, it was regarded, quite simply, as the judgment of God.
Its usual name was judicium Dei. Humanity needs a "good father"
to decide its great issues of guilt and settle its deadly quarrels. Since
the "bad father" feeling engenders hostility to a human judge what
could be more natural than to submit the problem to the Father
in Heaven?
In the second place, the painful test faithfully responded to the
crowd's feeling of ambivalence toward the accused. Since he was
charged with a serious offence under suspicious circumstances they
hate him as a felon and wish to see him suffer. But because they
also sympathized with him they wished to give him one last oppor-
tunity to escape. Thus the hot iron enabled the crowd to satisfy both
impulses at once. In a crowd men's minds are more easily swayed
by their leaders and the cruel savage side of their natures quick-
ly comes to the fore. We all catch glimpses of this at certain mo-
ments during boxing matches and football games. Newspaper ac-
counts of riots and strike violence prove it again and again. At
the hot iron ordeal the crowd's mood was cruel and morbid, some-
thing like that of people who hang around prisons during an execu-
tion. Needless to say, the bitterness of the party injured or his kin-
folk found an outlet of great satisfaction. And there were no sud-
den stabs of guilt or fear to interrupt this pleasant orgy of sadism.
For this was a necessary and proper proceeding: legal and ecclesi-
astical too. They were just innocent bystanders holding up their
children to get a better view. Of course there is nothing quite like
it today; just newspaper columns about the electric chair with
pictures of the body.
Did these unpleasant sights of wrongdoers in distress deter
like rogues and diminish crime? It was the opinion of Maitland,
who studied the early records for many years, that "crimes of vio-
lence were common and that criminal law was exceedingly ineffi-
cient."22 However, the ordeal dramatized in a most satisfying fa-
shion the ideal of law enforcement and surely gave many people a
2o LE, SUPERSTTION Am FoRcE 402 (4th ed. 1892).
21 Compare Judge Arnold's account of the modern criminal trial in Sym-
Bois or Govm%=NT 128-149 (1935).
22 2 Por ocK AND MArraN, HIsMsORY oF ENGLISH LAW 557 (2nd ed. 1899).
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comforting feeling that felons were being brought to justice regu-
larly. And many people doubtless assumed (as many do today) that
the cruel ordeals and savage punishments (death or loss of the hand,
foot or eyes) deterred potential offenders by proving that "crime
does not pay." All this brought a sense of peace and security to
many minds whatever the actual facts might be. Indeed the very
prevalence of so much crime and violence only served to increase
the community's need for the comforting illusion that the law was
being vigorously enforced.
The ordeal of cold water was likewise carried out under the
auspices of the Church. After fasting, prayer, Mass, etc., the accused
was bound with his hands beneath his knees and lowered gently
at the end of a rope into the blessed water. If his body sank below
the surface he was adjudged innocent. Lea suggests that "a skillful
management of the rope might easily produce the appearance of
floating when a conviction was desired by the priestly operators.123
It leaned heavily upon Christianity for its support by reason of its
similarity to baptism. Its psychological effects upon the community
and the complaining party were analogous to those of the hot iron
but much less extreme. Where the hot iron was cruel, the cold
water was humiliating; where the hot iron was dangerous, the cold
water was merely unpleasant.
What shall we say of the famous Norman institution, trial by
battle? If we look back at it from the rationalistic point of view of
a modern law school classroom it seems primitive and bizarre. But
if we remind ourselves that the success of a procedural institution
depends very much upon its ability to handle man's aggressive im-
pulses and dramatize his cherished ideals with appropriate serious-
ness, we can understand its frequent use among the warlike Nor-
mans. As some writers have remarked, it was a blood-feud in
miniature so insulated that it could not harm the community. It
did not operate so much by deflecting and dissipating the litigant's
animosity as by confining it to the opponent. But the judicial bat-
tle was not a mere duel: there was much more to it than this. Each
party stated his case in solemn and traditional form. An issue was
reached. The court carefully deliberated and pronounced its con-
sidered medial judgment: the issue was to be decided by Divine
Providence as in the ordeals. The vehicle for this test was a solemn
contest between man and man fought with the traditional weapons
of an earlier age signifying the dignity of the occasion.
Women and children and the physically unfit could not fight
in person so they were permitted to be represented by an able-
bodied friend. Other persons clamored for the same privilege un-
til everyone was allowed to retain a champion except where
23I SeE'asrIoN Aiq FoRcE 318 n. 1. (4th ed. 1892).
1953]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
charged with a serious offense. Professionalism reared its head.
The litigant was identified with his professional champion in much
the same way that a modern college is identified with its football
team. For those who objected to changes a comforting fiction was
devised by the legal mind: the champion swore that his father was
a witness to the true facts in issue and that his father on his death-
bed made the champion promise to defend the right.
Dean Pound and others have written of the "sporting theory
of justice"2 4 which influenced the legal procedure of American
states during the pioneer days of the last century. There were
very few forms of public entertainment. Of these the lawsuit was
one of the most important. Farmers and townfolk would gather at
the courthouse to hear the attorneys do battle with ingenious quid-
dities, grandiloquent phrases and passionate melodrama. It was the
same love of a good fight that endeared trial by battle to the Anglo-
Normans. Of course trial by battle is too simple a device to satisfy
us today; we are much too sophisticated. Imagine millions of dol-
lars hanging on the outcome of a fight between professional slug-
gers! But there is one aspect of the old battle which modern law
has copied and that is the use of champions. The analogy has been
frequently pointed out: they used gladiators; we use attorneys.
This is a very effective way of absorbing the litigants' animosity
toward each other. As in the oath test, attention is shifted from
the quarrel to the proof, from the opponent to the opponent's cham-
pion. It has been shrewdly observed that in modern litigation each
party ends up hating his opponent's lawyer more than his opponent.
And if we look at the matter through the eyes of the modern lay
client exclusively the modern suit resembles even more the ancient
battle. For the layman cannot understand all the details of a mod-
ern lawsuit: the arguments based on precedents, the fine points of
procedural cut and thrust, the choice of various potential "issues."
He only knows that his lawyer is in there doing battle for him, and
like the medieval client he is uncertain of the outcome. The only
important difference, as the layman sees it, is that the medieval
slug-fest would seem incredibly crude and vulgar to him. He does
not really understand modern legal techniques; he cannot penetrate
the screen of words that conceals the human judgments; but he
takes it on faith to be profound and learned so he sits back and
listens respectfully.
This completes our psychological account of the most impor-
tant modes of proof used in England in the twelfth century. In
stressing their effectiveness for various purposes we must, of course,
disclaim any suggestion that wise persons invented them or advo-
cated their use with these psychological effects in mind. Their
24 PoUN, Spnur or Em CommoN LAw 124-128 (1921).
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origins are lost in the mists of "non-historical-evidence." The kings,
priests, nobles, and doomsmen who supported and employed them
had little, if any, psychological insight into their functions in the
community. But over a period of time people responded quite un-
consciously to their dramatic appeal, their gratification of cruel im-
pulses, and the logic of their magic. These qualities enabled them
to survive. Lea describes a number of ordeals and tests (such as
the ordeal of the lot) which made their appearance on the stage of
history but failed to gain any wide acceptance. They failed because
they lacked the qualities we have discussed.
"One point still troubles me," says the modem student. "Sure-
ly there must have been some shrewd persons who raised skeptical
doubts about these ancient proofs as infallible guides to the truth."
Of course there were. From the Ninth Century onward we read
criticisms and protests.2s William Rufus jeered at the hot iron.
But the ancient proofs continued in use all over Europe until well
into the Thirteenth Century and in some places much longer. From
the Ninth Century onward the stream of criticism gathered strength
until civilian lawyers, bishops, popes, kings, and emperors were
united against them. The human mind is frequently ambivalent;
nothing is more common than to find people criticizing a cherished
institution which they constantly rely upon. Indeed one might just
as well ask: "Are people today skeptical about trial by jury?" Of
course they are; and many books have been written on the subject
including satirical plays and novels, but trial by jury goes march-
ing on. For several centuries the old proofs were in much the same
situation. Critics blasted them; apologists defended them (e.g., by
explaining that innocent men sometimes failed at the ordeal as a
punishment for their sins). The old proofs continued in use.
"But," says the student, "were not the old proofs eventually
replaced by a system of gathering evidence for rational evalua-
tion?" No indeed. In England they were slowly displaced by a
"jury of neighbours" who were expected to know the facts of the
case from their own experience or from the reports of others.26
There was no procedure for gathering evidence or taking testi-
mony in court. It was hoped that the "jury of neighbours" had
picked up some information before they came to court. But even
if they had failed to do this they had to decide the case as best they
could. On the Continent the old proofs lost ground to the Romano-
canonical inquisitory procedure. This did involve gathering evi-
dence; testimony was taken privately by the judge and written
25 See appropriate chapter headings in LEA, Su IRsIoI AND FoRcE (4th
ed. 1892).
26 See 2 PoLLocK AND MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 621-641 (2nd. ed.
1899).
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down. This evidence was then read aloud at a public session. But
the judge did not assume the responsibility for evaluating the evi-
dence; a mechanical system27 was followed which evaluated wit-
nesses according to age, sex and social rank and produced whole
proofs, half proofs, quarter proofs, etc. The supposed force of the
written proof rested upon the fallacy of mystical connection ex-
plained above; the judges merely declared whether or not a proof
had been made according to the "ancient" rules. It would be a
long time yet before a judge anywhere would dare to use his com-
mon sense and reason in evaluating evidence.
"Well then," says the student (having learned his lesson only
too well) "if the old dramatic magical proofs were so deeply root-
ed in human needs and desires, how do you explain the fact that
the 'jury of neighbours' dislodged them and took their place in
popular esteem?" That is rather a long story. When trial by "jury
of neighbours" first appeared it was a royal privilege available only
in the king's courts. There were, of course, many other courts of
great importance where it is unknown. And in the royal court it
was merely one of several modes of proof; oath, battle and ordeals
were used there also. In the competition of proof against proof sev-
eral factors contributed to the jury's success. First, trial by bat-
tle was a Norman proof, never very popular with the Anglo-Saxons
and quite expensive. Secondly, in 1215 the Lateran Council de-
nounced the ordeals and withdrew the support of the church. The
church's power was very great in England at this time and the or-
deals never recovered from the blow. The king's judges had to find
a substitute. Thirdly, the type of case assigned to the jury in its
early days always involved the question of recent possession of land
-a matter of fact about which the jury and the rest of the com-
munity would not be likely to disagree.
But the best reason for the jury's success lay in the fact that it
was able to draw to itself all the dramatic elements and magical logic
of the ancient proofs so that people could think of it as functioning
just as they had functioned. Almost everything was preserved ex-
cept the cruelty and violence of the hot iron.
First, it introduced into the royal courts' procedure a new type
of battle. With the older proofs the pleadings were simple and
declamatory: there was no point in telling the court about an in-
volved set of facts when the issue of greater right was going to
be settled by battle. But when the proof is by jury we find plain-
tiffs stating their claims in great detail to bring the facts to the
jury's attention. We find defendants alleging specific facts which
they hope will upset the plaintiff, because the jury will know they
27 See ENGELMANN, HMsToY OF CoNTnarNTA Cxvm Pocnmm 41 ff. (1927).
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are true.28 We find the royal judges who preside at these pleading
sessions laying down rules of law and disallowing certain defences.
In short, the pleadings must be framed to win the jury's verdict and
the royal judge's approval. Though orally announced they are now
recorded in writing. Pleading became a difficult art and the legal
profession was born. The skilled pleader became the client's cham-
pion in the new style of trial by battle.
The jury duplicated the oath-helpers very closely. The older
logic of word-magic could be applied to a verdict under oath as well
as to a series of oaths. Oath-helpers are thought of as "character
witnesses"; juries can be that, too, for they are "of the vicinage."
What then of the judgment of God? Why, the jury simply took that
over also. Divine Providence could speak as well through the ver-
dict of twelve as through a burnt hand. That is why their verdict
had to be unanimous and there was virtually no appeal from their
decision. While they deliberated they took no food or drink. Fi-
nally let us notice that they do the work of the older proofs in an
even more important respect. The royal judge with his strong
king behind him makes a rather impressive father figure. But
his position becomes much more secure when he has the jury be-
low him as a "shock absorber."
2 8 See POLLocx AND MaimTN, I-SToR oF ENGmSH LAw, 616 ff. (2nd. ed.
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